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Abstract
We provide a theory of truncation for incomplete insurance-market economies
with aggregate shocks, which is shown to be a consistent representation of standard
incomplete-market economies. This representation allows deriving optimal policies
with capital and aggregate shock. We apply this framework to an economy where
the government can use capital and labor taxes, positive transfers and public debt
to smooth aggregate shocks. The average capital tax is shown to be positive if and
only if credit constraints are binding for some households. In a quantitative exercise,
the capital tax appears to be more volatile than the labor tax and public debt is
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1 Introduction
Incomplete insurance-market economies provide a useful framework to think about many
relevant aspects of inequalities and individual risk in general equilibrium. In these mod-
els, infinite-lived agents face incomplete insurance markets and borrowing limits that
prevent them from perfectly hedging their idiosyncratic risk, in the tradition of the
Bewley-Huggett-Aiyagari literature (Bewley 1983, Imrohoroğlu 1989, Huggett 1993, Aiya-
gari 1994). These frameworks are becoming increasingly popular and are now widely used,
since they fill a gap between micro- and macroeconomics and enable the inclusion of ag-
gregate shocks and a number of additional frictions on both the goods and labor markets.
However, considering normative analysis, little is known about optimal policies in these
environments, due to the difficulties generated by the large and time-varying heterogene-
ity across agents. This is unfortunate, since a vast literature, reviewed below, suggests
that the interaction between wealth inequalities and capital accumulation has first-order
implications for the optimal design of time-varying fiscal policies.
This paper presents a methodological contribution that offers a general and tractable
representation of incomplete insurance-market economies. This representation allows us
to easily solve for the Ramsey program in incomplete insurance-market economies with
both capital and aggregate shocks. We apply our framework to provide a theoretical and
quantitative analysis of optimal fiscal policy. We derive new results about the optimal
dynamics of public debt, distorting capital and labor taxes and transfers, considering rich
trade-offs involving redistribution, insurance, and incentives.
When insurance markets are incomplete, heterogeneity increases as time goes by, be-
cause agents differ according to the whole history of their idiosyncratic risk realizations.
Huggett (1993), using the results of Hopenhayn and Prescott (1992), and Aiyagari (1994)
have shown that these economies without aggregate risk have a recursive structure when
the distribution of wealth is introduced as a state variable. Unfortunately, the distribu-
tion of wealth has an infinite support, which is the root of many analytical difficulties.
Our methodological contribution is to show that incomplete-market economies can be
represented as the limit of economies with finite support. More precisely, we construct an
environment where the heterogeneity across agents depends only on a finite but arbitrarily
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large number, denoted N , of consecutive past realizations of the idiosyncratic risk. As a
theoretical outcome, agents having the same idiosyncratic risk history for the previous N
periods choose the same consumption and wealth levels. The interest of this truncated
representation of incomplete insurance-market economies lies in four properties. First,
the allocation can be represented as the solution of the program of a constrained planner,
which ensures the existence of the equilibrium with aggregate shocks. Second, the policy
rules of our truncated representation converge, for large N , toward those of a standard
incomplete-market model under general conditions. Third and more importantly, as our
representation has a finite state-space, we can use the tools derived in Marcet and Mari-
mon (2011) to derive Ramsey programs. These tools rely on the extensive use of Lagrange
coefficients. Finally, the finite state-space simplifies to a large extent the simulation of
the model, as standard perturbation methods can be used.
Regarding the Ramsey program in an incomplete-market economy with technological
shock, and following the literature, we consider that the planner has four instruments:
taxes on capital, taxes on labor, public debt, and positive transfers. We derive three sets
of results.
First, for any truncation N , the average optimal long-run capital tax is directly related
to the severity of credit constraints. More formally, the tax on capital is proportional to
the sum of the Lagrange multipliers of agents’ credit constraints. The capital tax is thus
always non-negative (as already found in Aiyagari 1995) and is positive if and only if
credit constraints bind for some agents in equilibrium. This result contributes to clarify
the deviations from the Chamley (1986) and Judd (1985a) no-capital tax result found
in the literature. In addition, the pre-tax marginal return on capital is uniquely pinned
down by the planner discount factor, as originally found by Aiyagari (1995). Finally,
labor taxes are shown to directly depend on the elasticity of labor supply.
Second, the dynamics of the fiscal policy is mainly driven by the gap in two valuations
of liquidity. The first one is the planner valuation of government liquidity, measured by
the Lagrange multiplier of the government budget constraint. The second one is the social
valuation of the liquidity of private agents. Since the planner internalizes agents’ saving
incentives, this valuation differs from private agents’ valuation. The difference in these
liquidity valuations, the so-called liquidity valuation gap, is key to understand optimal
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fiscal policy dynamics.
Third, we simulate the model to determine the optimal fiscal policy after a technology
in a model where households face employment risk. We find that the steady-state level
of public debt is negative, and its level is countercyclical. The capital tax is procyclical
and much more volatile than the labor tax.
Related literature. This paper first contributes to the literature on the theory of in-
complete insurance-market economies with aggregate shocks. Some environments already
provide a tractable framework. This is the case of no-trade equilibria with permanent
idiosyncratic shocks (Constantinides and Duffie 1996), used for instance in Heathcote,
Storesletten, and Violante (2016). More recently, Krusell, Mukoyama, and Smith (2011)
study a class of no-trade equilibria in an economy without capital and with a tight-enough
credit constraint, as in Ravn and Sterk (2017). Departing from no-trade, a class of “small
trade” equilibria, featuring “reduced heterogeneity” with a finite number of wealth levels,
has been studied (Challe and Ragot 2016, LeGrand and Ragot 2016, Challe, Matheron,
Ragot, and Rubio-Ramirez 2015, Ragot 2016, Bilbiie and Ragot 2017). The current paper
extends these previous works and provides a general theory of truncated representations of
incomplete-market economies, which is a consistent representation of Bewley economies.
In addition, it derives new tools to study optimal policies, based on the dynamic structure
of Lagrange coefficients.
Second, our paper contributes to the literature on distortions and optimal policies in
incomplete insurance-market models. Many contributions identify a number of relevant
trade-offs, but the general case with capital accumulation and aggregate shocks has not
been studied yet, to the best of our knowledge.1 In economies without aggregate shocks,
Aiyagari (1995) shows that the capital tax is non-negative. Aiyagari and McGrattan
(1998) compute the optimal steady-state level of debt. Dávila, Hong, Krusell, and Ríos-
Rull (2012) show that the capital stock can be too low. Açikgöz (2015) solves for the
Ramsey program to obtain the steady-state optimal level of public debt. Dyrda and
Pedroni (2016) solve numerically for the optimal policies along the transition between
1Many papers have considered incomplete insurance markets to analyze the positive effect of fiscal
policies. The positive effects are studied in Heathcote (2005), who considers aggregate shocks. A recent
contribution is Kaplan and Violante (2014), who introduce transaction costs for some assets.
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two steady-states. Gottardi, Kajii, and Nakajima (2014) compute the Ramsey allocation
in a model with human capital accumulation. Nuño and Moll (2017) use a continuous-time
approach and mean-field games to characterize differences in inequalities for economies
without aggregate shocks. Shin (2006) studies a two-agent economy to derive additional
results. Recently, Bhandari, Evans, Golosov, and Sargent (2013, 2016b) derive results
about optimal policies in environments with incomplete insurance markets and aggregate
shocks. They study an economy without capital, with lump-sum taxes, and where credit
constraints are loose enough such that they never bind in equilibrium. They show that
public debt is irrelevant, what simplifies the state space and allows introducing additional
features. Instead, we study an economy with capital (and capital tax) and we allow
for binding credit constraints. Besides being closely connected to the Chamley-Judd
literature on capital taxation, our analysis also relates to the literature on the optimal
quantity of safe assets, as the steady-state level of public debt is well-defined in our
economy (see Gorton, Lewellen, and Metrick 2012 and Golec and Perotti 2017, for a
survey and references).2
Third, this paper is also related to the vast literature on optimal fiscal policy with
aggregate shocks. Seminal contributions consider a complete-market economy with a rep-
resentative agent (Barro 1979, Lucas and Stokey 1983, surveyed in Chari and Kehoe 1999).
More recent contributions consider incomplete markets for the aggregate risk, introduc-
ing non state-contingent public debt (Aiyagari, Marcet, Sargent, and Seppälä 2002, Farhi
2010, Bhandari, Evans, Golosov, and Sargent 2016a). Several papers have additionally
introduced ex-ante heterogeneity among agents (see Bassetto 2014, Azzimonti, de Fran-
cisco, and Krusell 2008a and 2008b, Azzimonti and Yared 2017, Correia 2010, Greulichy,
Laczo, and Marcet 2016). The New Dynamic Public Finance literature focuses on optimal
fiscal policy in environments with heterogeneous and private information (Mirrlees 1971,
Golosov and Tsyvinski 2007, Werning 2007 among others). Here, we focus on a Ramsey
approach, limiting the number of instruments (see Farhi and Werning 2013, and Golosov,
2Some papers have introduced incomplete insurance markets in overlapping generation models to quan-
titatively investigate optimal fiscal policies (Imrohoroğlu 1998, and Conesa, Kitao, and Krueger 2009).
There is a large literature on the effect of public debt, for instance explained by generational accounting:
Auerbach, Gokhale, and Kotlikoff (1991, 1994) for seminal contributions and Bassetto and Kocherlakota
(2004) for an extension to distortionary taxes. We do not explicitly consider intergenerational transfers
in our analysis.
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Tsyvinski, and Werquin 2016 for a discussion).
This paper is also, but more indirectly, related to the computational literature studying
incomplete insurance markets with perturbation methods. Reiter (2009) uses perturbation
methods to solve for aggregate dynamics, by discretizing the wealth distribution to obtain
a finite-dimensional state space.3 Instead, we construct economies which deliver a finite-
dimensional state-space in the space of histories, as a theoretical outcome. This last
property is key to be able to derive optimal policies with a number of instruments.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we present the environment.
We describe the family head problem and derive the associated allocation in Section 3. We
then show in Section 4 the decentralization mechanism. We solve the Ramsey program
in Section 5 and discuss in Section 6 the Ramsey program fiscal policy. In Section 7, we
provide a numerical application illustrating our findings. Finally, conclusions are given in
Section 8.
2 The environment
Time is discrete, indexed by t ≥ 0. The economy is populated by a continuum of agents
of size 1, distributed on a segment J following a non-atomic measure `: `(J) = 1.4
2.1 Risk
Aggregate risk. The aggregate risk is represented by a probability space (S∞,F ,P).
In any period t, the aggregate state, denoted st, takes values in the state space S ⊂ R+
and follows a first-order Markov process. The history of aggregate shocks up to time t
is denoted st = {s0, . . . ., st} ∈ St+1. Finally, the period-0 probability density function of
any history st is denoted mt(st).
3Other numerical methods using perturbation methods are developed in Mertens and Judd (2012),
Preston and Roca (2007), Kim, Kollmann, and Kim (2010) or Winberry (2016) who approximates the
wealth distribution by a finite number of parameters.
4We assume that the law of large numbers holds. See Green (1994) for a proper construction of J and
`. See also Feldman and Gilles (1985), Judd (1985b), and Uhlig (1996) for other solutions.
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Idiosyncratic risk. At the beginning of each period, agents face an uninsurable
idiosyncratic labor productivity shock et that can take E + 1 values in the set E =
{0, . . . , E} ∈ RE+1+ . Agents in state e ∈ E , e 6= 0, have a labor productivity θe > 0, which
is assumed to be increasing in e, without loss of generality. Agents in state e = 0 have a
zero market productivity but devote a fixed amount of δ > 0 labor units to earn a home
production of δ units of final goods. The former agents can be considered as employed
workers with various productivities, while the latter can be considered as unemployed
workers. This modeling choice enables us to cover the various cases that can be found in
the literature.
The productivity shock et follows a discrete first-order Markov process with transition
matrix M(st) ∈ [0, 1](E+1)×(E+1). The probability Me,e′(st) is the probability for an agent
to switch from state e at date t to state e′ at date t+ 1, when the aggregate state is st in
period t. The history of idiosyncratic shocks up to date t is denoted et = {e0, . . . , et} ∈
E t+1.
Remark 1 (Notations) For the sake of clarity, for any random variable Xt : St → R,
we will denote Xt, instead of Xt(st), its realization in state st, and for any random variable
Yt : St × E t → R, we will denote Yt,et its realization in state (st, et).
2.2 Preferences
In each period, the economy has two goods: a consumption-capital good and labor.
Agents rank consumption c and labor l according to a smooth period utility function
U(c, l), satisfying standard regularity properties. As is standard in this class of models, we
consider a Greenwood-Hercowitz-Huffman (GHH) utility function, exhibiting no wealth
effect for the labor supply:5
U(c, l) = u
(
c− χ−1 l
1+1/ϕ
1 + 1/ϕ
)
, (1)
5All our results can be derived with a general utility function U(c, l). A GHH utility function slightly
simplifies the algebra, especially when deriving the Ramsey program in Section 5. Admittedly, and as
shown by Marcet, Obiols-Homs, and Weil (2007), considering an alternative utility function would affect
the optimal tax schedule, as aggregate labor supply would depend on the wealth distribution.
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where ϕ > 0 is the Frisch elasticity of labor supply, χ > 0 scales labor disutility, and
u : R+ → R is twice continuously derivable, increasing, and concave, with u′(0) = ∞.
Each agent ranks consumption and labor streams, denoted respectively as (ct)t≥0 and
(lt)t≥0, according to the intertemporal criterion
∑∞
t=0 β
tU(ct, lt), where β ∈ (0, 1) is the
discount factor.
2.3 Production and assets
In any period t, a production technology with constant returns to scale (CRS) transforms
capital Kt−1 and labor Lt into F (Kt−1, Lt, st) units of output. The production function is
smooth in K and L and satisfies the standard Inada conditions. Capital must be installed
one period before production, and the state of the world possibly affects productivity
through a technology shock. This formulation allows for capital depreciation, which is
subsumed by the production function F , as in Farhi (2010) for instance. Labor Lt is mea-
sured in efficient units, and is equal to the sum of the individual labor efforts expressed in
efficient units: Lt =
´
i∈J θeitli,t`(di). The good is produced by a unique profit-maximizing
representative firm. We denote as w˜t the real before-tax wage rate in period t and as r˜t
the real before-tax rental rate of capital in period t. Profit maximization yields in each
period t ≥ 1:
r˜t = FK(Kt−1, Lt, st) and w˜t = FL(Kt−1, Lt, st). (2)
Finally, agents save using two assets, which are claims on the capital stock and public
debt. In addition, agents cannot borrow more than an exogenous borrowing limit −a¯ ≤ 0.
2.4 Government, fiscal tools, and resource constraints
In each period t, the government has to finance an exogenous public good expenditure G
and it can choose a positive lump-sum transfer Tt ≥ 0 paid to all agents. The government
can levy distorting taxes on capital income τKt or on labor income τLt or issue an amount
Bt of a riskless one-period public bond.6 As in Heathcote (2005), we assume that the
6The question of the optimal mix of these financing tools will be the focus of the second part of the
paper and in particular of the Ramsey program studied in Section 5.
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public debt pays the economy-wide interest rate r˜t for any aggregate history st ∈ St. The
same tax rate τKt applies to public bonds and capital shares. In consequence, both assets
are perfect substitutes for agents. Positive lump-sum transfers Tt > 0 are allowed be-
cause Heathcote, Storesletten, and Violante (2016) show that they are needed to properly
approximate the current US fiscal system. Following the tradition of Lucas and Stokey
(1983), lump-sum taxes (or negative Tt) are not available.7
As is standard, we also assume that the date-0 capital tax rate, bearing on initial
capital, is exogenously set. Indeed, taxing capital in the first period is non-distorting,
and the government would heavily tax the initial capital stock (see Farhi 2010, or Sargent
and Ljungqvist 2012, Section 16.7 for a discussion). The period-t budget constraint of
the government is:
G+ (1 + r˜t)Bt−1 + Tt ≤ τLt w˜tLt + τKt r˜tAt−1 +Bt. (3)
We denote the after-tax real interest and wage rates respectively as:
rt = (1− τKt )r˜t and wt = (1− τLt )w˜t. (4)
Using the CRS property of the production function, the budget constraint (3) becomes:
G+ rtKt−1 + wtLt + (1 + rt)Bt−1 + Tt ≤ F (Kt−1, Lt, st) +Bt. (5)
Finally, if Ctott denotes the total consumption in period t, the economy-wide resource
constraint is G+Ctott +Kt ≤ F (Kt−1, Lt, st) +Kt−1 +St,0(st)δ, where St,0(st) denotes the
size of the population in state e = 0 at date t and thus producing δ.
3 The island economy
In general, the previous economy features a growing heterogeneity in wealth levels over
time, because agents with different idiosyncratic histories will choose different savings.
This heterogeneity can be represented by a time-varying distribution of wealth levels with
7We assume the absence of non-distorting taxes (Tt < 0) to follow the literature (see also Aiyagari,
Marcet, Sargent, and Seppälä 2002), but the case where these taxes are available can be easily studied,
as shown below.
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infinite support, which raises considerable theoretical and computational challenges. We
now present an environment in which the savings of each agent depends on the realizations
of the idiosyncratic risk for only a given number of consecutive past periods, and not on
the whole history. As an endogenous outcome, the heterogeneity among the population
is summarized by a finite (but possibly large) number of agent types.
To simplify the exposition, we present this economy using the family and island
metaphor (see Lucas 1975 and 1990, or Heathcote, Storesletten, and Violante 2016 for
a recent reference). The gain of this presentation strategy is that equilibrium existence
can be proved using standard techniques. In Section 4 below, we show that the island
allocation can be decentralized.
We denote by N ≥ 0 the length of the truncation for idiosyncratic histories.
Island description. There are (E + 1)N different islands, where we recall that the
cardinal of the set E of idiosyncratic risk realizations is E + 1. Agents with the same
idiosyncratic history for the last N periods are located on the same island. Any island is
represented by a vector eN = (eN−N+1, . . . , eN0 ) ∈ EN summarizing the N -period idiosyn-
cratic history of all island inhabitants. At the beginning of each period, agents face a new
idiosyncratic shock. Agents with history eˆN ∈ EN in the previous period are endowed
in the current period with history eN , and we denote eN  eˆN when eN is a possible
continuation of eˆN . The specification N = 0 corresponds to the full insurance case (only
one island), and thus to the standard representative-agent assumption. Symmetrically,
the case N = +∞ corresponds to a standard incomplete-market economy with aggregate
shocks, à la Krusell and Smith (1998).
The family head. The family head maximizes the welfare of the whole family, attribut-
ing an identical weight to all agents and being price-taker.8 The family head can freely
transfer resources among agents within the same island, but cannot do so across islands.
All agents belonging to the same island are treated identically and will therefore receive
the same allocation, as is consistent with welfare maximization. For agents in any island
8As the family head does not internalize the effect of its choice on prices, the allocation is not
constrained-efficient, and the distortions identified by Davila et al. (2012) are present in the equilib-
rium allocation. The planner will reduce them with its instruments, defined in Section 5.
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eN ∈ EN , the family head will choose the per-capita consumption level ct,eN , the labor
supply lt,eN , and the end-of-period savings at,eN (remember that capital and public debt
are substitutes).
Agents face borrowing constraints, and their asset holdings must be higher than −a¯.9
Some proofs below require that agents cannot save more than amax. This maximal amount
can be chosen to be arbitrarily large, in particular such that it is never a binding con-
straint.10 Finally, we assume that all agents enter the economy with an initial wealth
(a−1,eN )eN∈EN .
Island sizes. The probability Πt,eˆN ,eN that an agent with history eˆN = (eˆN−N+1, . . . , eˆN0 )
in period t experiences history eN = (eN−N+1, . . . , eN0 ) in period t + 1 is the probability
to switch from state eˆN0 at t to state eN0 at t + 1, provided that histories eˆN and eN are
compatible. Formally, we have Πt,eˆN ,eN = 1eNeˆNMeˆN0 ,eN0 (st), where 1eNeˆN = 1 if e
N is
a possible continuation of history eˆN and 0 otherwise. We can thus deduce the law of
motion of island sizes (St,eN )t≥0,eN∈EN :
St+1,eN =
∑
eˆN∈EN
St,eˆNΠt,eˆN ,eN , (6)
where the initial size of each island (S−1,eN )eN∈EN , with
∑
eN∈EN S−1,eN = 1, is given. The
law of motion (6) is thus valid from period 0 onwards.
Timing. At the beginning of each period t, agents learn their current idiosyncratic shock
and have to move from an island eˆN to the relevant island eN . The family head cannot
change the allocation in the period, before agents leave the island. As a consequence,
agents move by taking with them their wealth, equal to the per-capita saving at−1,eˆN . On
island eN , the wealth of all agents coming from island eˆN (equal to St−1,eˆNΠt−1,eˆN ,eNat−1,eˆN )
– and for all islands eˆN– are pooled together and then equally divided among the St,eN
9See Aiyagari (1994) for a discussion of the relevant values for of a¯, called the natural borrowing limit
in an economy without aggregate shocks. See Shin (2006) for a discussion with aggregate shocks. A
standard value in the literature is a¯ = 0, which ensures that consumption is positive in all states of the
world.
10As for instance in Szeidl (2013), the assumption on the maximal bound amax enables us to consider
a general utility function. An alternative option is to assume a bounded periodic utility function u, as in
Miao (2006).
11
agents of island eN . Therefore, each of these agents holds, in the beginning of period t,
the wealth a˜t,eN equal to:
a˜t,eN =
∑
eˆN∈EN
St−1,eˆN
St,eN
Πt−1,eˆN ,eNat−1,eˆN . (7)
The program of the family head can now be expressed as follows:11
max
(at,eN ,ct,eN ,lt,eN )t≥0,eN∈EN
E0
∞∑
t=0
βt
 ∑
eN∈EN
St,eNU
(
ct,eN , lt,eN
) , (8)
at,eN + ct,eN = wtθeN0 lt,eN1eN0 6=0 + δ1eN0 =0 + (1 + rt)a˜t,eN + Tt, for all e
N ∈ EN , (9)
ct,eN , lt,eN ≥ 0, at,eN ≥ −a¯, for all eN ∈ EN , (10)
(S−1,eN )eN∈EN and (a−1,eN )eN∈EN are given, (11)
and subject to lt,eN = δ if eN0 = 0, the law of motion (6) for (St,eN )e
N∈EN
t≥0 , and to the
definition (7) of (a˜t,eN )e
N∈EN
t≥0 .12
The family head maximizes the aggregate welfare (8) subject to the budget constraints
(9) on all islands, to positivity and borrowing constraints (10), and to initial conditions
(11). As the objective function is concave, constraints are linear (i.e., the admissible set
is convex), and allocations are bounded (amax guarantees a compact admissible set), the
existence of the equilibrium can be proved using standard techniques – see Stokey and
Lucas (1989), and we omit it to save some space.13 If βtνt,eNm(st) denotes the Lagrange
multiplier of the credit constraint of island eN , first-order conditions are:
Uc(ct,eN , lt,eN ) = βEt
 ∑
e˜NeN
Πt,eN ,e˜NUc(ct+1,e˜N , lt+1,e˜N )(1 + rt+1)
+ νt,eN , (12)
lt,eN =
(
wtθeN0
)ϕ
1eN0 >0 + δ1eN0 =0, (13)
νt,eN (at,eN + a¯) = 0 and νt,eN ≥ 0. (14)
To anticipate Section 4 below, these first-order conditions (12)–(14) have the same form
11We denote eN0 the current idiosyncratic state in island eN , and 1eN0 =0 equals 1 if e
N
0 = 0 and 0
otherwise.
12Note that Et[·] in (8) is the expectation operator at date t ≥ 0 over all future aggregate histories.
13Due to the finite heterogeneity representation, we could also prove the existence of a recursive equi-
librium. To save some space, we do not present this recursive formulation, as it is not necessary to derive
first-order conditions.
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as the ones derived in standard incomplete insurance-market models. Indeed, although
the family head cares about agents moving across islands, the result is similar to the one
of individuals self-insuring against income risk, due to the law of large numbers.
Labor market. On any island eN , the market labor supply in efficient units at date t
amounts to θeN0 St,eN lt,eN (recall that θ0 = 0). Summing across all islands yields the total
labor supply:
Lt =
∑
eN∈EN
θeN0 St,eN lt,eN . (15)
Financial market. The total end-of-period savings of all agents, denoted At at date t
is:
At =
∑
eN∈EN
St,eNat,eN =
∑
eN∈EN
St+1,eN a˜t+1,eN , (16)
where the last equality stems from the pooling equation (7). The clearing of the financial
market at date t implies that at any date t, the following equality holds:
At = Bt +Kt. (17)
We can state our sequential equilibrium definition, similarly to Aiyagari, Marcet, Sar-
gent, and Seppälä (2002) and Farhi (2010).
Definition 1 (Sequential equilibrium) A sequential competitive equilibrium is a col-
lection of individual allocations
(
ct,eN , lt,eN , a˜t,eN , at,eN
)
t≥0,eN∈EN , of island population sizes(
St,eN
)
t≥0,eN∈EN , of aggregate quantities (Lt, At, Bt, Kt)t≥0, of price processes (wt, rt, r˜t, w˜t)t≥0
and of a fiscal policy (Tt, τKt+1, τLt , Bt)t≥0, such that, for an initial distribution of island
population and wealth
(
S−1,eN , a−1,eN
)
eN∈EN , and for initial values of the capital stock
K−1 =
∑
eN∈EN S−1,eNa−1,eN , of the public debt B−1, of the capital tax τ0, and of the
initial aggregate shock s−1, we have:
1. given prices, individual strategies
(
at,eN , ct,eN , lt,eN
)
t≥0,eN∈EN solve the agents’ opti-
mization program in equations (8)–(11);
2. island sizes and beginning of period individual wealth
(
St,eN , a˜t,eN
)
t≥0,eN∈EN are con-
sistent with law of motions (6) and (7);
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3. labor and financial markets clear at all dates: for any t ≥ 0, equations (15)–(17)
hold;
4. the government budget constraint (5) holds at any date;
5. factor prices (wt, rt, r˜t, w˜t)t≥0 are consistent with (2) and (4).
The equilibrium has a simple structure defined at each date by 6(E + 1)N + 8 vari-
ables and 6(E + 1)N + 8 equations for a given fiscal policy (Tt, τKt+1, τLt , Bt)t≥0, which is
endogenized below.
4 Decentralization and convergence properties
We now show that the previous program can be decentralized, and we prove that the
policy rules converge, for large N , toward the ones of a Bewley economy, under general
conditions. We start with given factor prices and without aggregate shocks. Two main
reasons motivate these restrictions. First, dropping aggregate shocks implies that we have
existence proof of a recursive representation in this case (see Huggett 1993). Second, fixing
factor prices avoids issues related to equilibrium multiplicity that may otherwise emerge,
as shown in Açikgöz (2016) for instance.14
The economy is now similar to the one of Section 2, except for the following differences.
First, we consider as given a constant after-tax interest rate r – with β(1+r) < 1 – an after-
tax wage w, and a constant transfer T . We discuss below the case with aggregate shocks.
Second, no family head imposes allocations, and agents are expected-utility maximizers
taking fiscal policy as given. Finally, each agent receives at each date a lump-sum transfer
ΓN+1(eN+1), which is contingent on her individual history eN+1 over the previous N + 1
periods. This is the actual difference with a standard incomplete-market framework.
14This section can be skipped if the reader is convinced by the relevance of the island economy and
wants to directly consider Ramsey policy in this environment.
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Using standard techniques, the agents’ program can be written recursively as:15
VN+1(a, eN+1) = max
a′,c,l
U(c, l) + βE
 ∑
(eN+1)′eN+1
ΠeN+1,(eN+1)′VN+1(a′,
(
eN+1
)′
)
 , (18)
a′ + c = wθeN0 l1eN0 6=0 + δ1eN0 =0 + (1 + r)a+ T + ΓN+1(e
N+1), (19)
c, l ≥ 0, a′ ≥ −a¯, (20)
with l = δ if eN0 = 0, and where VN+1 : [−a, amax] × EN+1 → R is the value function,
and eN0 the current idiosyncratic shock realization. Compared to the economies studied
by Huggett (1993) and Aiyagari (1994), the individual history eN+1 is a state variable, as
it determines the transfer ΓN+1(eN+1). The Lagrange coefficient of the credit constraint
a′ ≥ −a¯ is denoted ν, and the solution of this program consists of the policy rules
gN+1c , g
N+1
a′ , gN+1l and gN+1ν – defined over [−a, amax] × EN+1 determining respectively
consumption, savings, labor supply, and the Lagrange multiplier of the individual budget
constraint. We now state our characterization result.
Proposition 1 (Finite state space) There exists a balanced transfer Γ∗N+1, such that
any optimal allocation of the family head program (8)–(11) is also a solution to the de-
centralized program (18)–(20).
The previous proposition states that the family head program presented in Section 3
can be decentralized by the balanced lump-sum transfer Γ∗N+1. This transfer consists in
pooling the resources of all agents having the same idiosyncratic history for N+1 periods,
and redistributes the same amount to agents having the same idiosyncratic history for N
periods, such that there are only (E+1)N possible wealth levels. Thus, the transfer Γ∗N+1
mimics the wealth pooling of the island economy, formalized in equation (7), that occurs
when agents transfer from one island to another one.
Note that the standard Bewley economy is simply defined as the previous program
where we further impose ΓN+1(eN+1) = 0 for all periods. In this case, we need only the
current idiosyncratic state as a state variable (instead of the whole history eN+1). The
value function is then denoted V Bewley : [−a, amax] × E → R, while we denote V ∗N+1 the
15Following the literature, we denote as a′ the savings choice in the current period. The value a is thus
the beginning-of-period wealth.
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value function of the program (18)–(20) for the transfer Γ∗N+1. We can now state our
convergence result.
Proposition 2 (Convergence) For given factor prices and for the transfer Γ∗N+1, if
there exists κ ∈ (0, 1) and N ≥ 1, such that for all N ≥ N , such that for all (eN¯−1, . . . , e0) ∈
EN , and (fN , . . . , fN¯), (gN , . . . , gN¯) ∈ EN− ¯N+1 and a1, a2 ∈ [−a, amax]:∣∣∣gN+1a′ (a1, (fN , . . . , fN¯ , eN¯−1, . . . , e0))−gN+1a′ (a2, (gN , . . . , gN¯ , eN¯−1, . . . , e0))∣∣∣ < κ |a1−a2|,
(21)
then limN→∞ |Γ∗N+1| = 0, and for all a ∈ [−a, amax] and (eN , e) ∈ EN+1:
lim
N→∞
V ∗N+1
(
a, (eN , e)
)
= V Bewley(a, e).
Though involved, condition (21) has a simple meaning. It states that the marginal
propensity to save is always smaller than 1 for all agents, as soon as N is high enough.
When this condition is fulfilled, the transfer tends toward 0 as the length of idiosyncratic
history N increases. Indeed, if the saving propensity is strictly lower than one, initial
differences in wealth vanish and agents experiencing the same history of idiosyncratic
shocks end up having the same wealth as time goes by. As a consequence, the wealth
pooling generated by the transfer Γ∗N+1 concerns wealth levels which tend to be closer
to each other, and the transfer Γ∗N+1 tends toward 0. In this case, we can show that
the value function of the truncated economy converges toward the value function of the
Bewley economy, which depends only on the current idiosyncratic shock.
Although condition (21) involves the savings policy function rather than model exoge-
nous parameters, it is useful to understand and to check the convergence properties of the
truncated representation. By contradiction, it is easy to show that a necessary condition
for inequality (21) to be fulfilled is that the propensity to save is always strictly smaller
than one for all agents in the corresponding Bewley economy (i.e., with ΓN+1(eN+1) = 0).
To our knowledge, all calibrated Bewley models in the literature share this property, such
that one can be confident about the general relevance of this truncated representation of
incomplete-market economies.16
16It is possible to implement numerical methods to fasten the convergence of the truncated economy to
the Bewley allocation for small N . We don’t discuss here these computational considerations and focus
instead on the theoretical properties of optimal policies in this environment.
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In the economy with aggregate shocks, the limit of the truncated economy can be
proven to exist, following the same steps, if a condition similar to (21) is fulfilled for
any realization of the aggregate shock. However, it is difficult to compare this limit with
other models as, to our knowledge, there is no proof in the general case of the existence of
a recursive representation for incomplete-market economies with aggregate shocks when
the distribution of wealth is the only state variable (see Kubler and Schmedders 2002 and
2003, Miao 2006, Cao 2016, or Cheridito and Sagredo 2016b and 2016a, for example).
The current construction of a truncated economy could be the foundation of such a proof,
but we leave this possibility for future research.17
5 Optimal fiscal policy: The Ramsey problem
5.1 The Ramsey problem
We now solve the Ramsey program in our incomplete-market island economy with aggre-
gate shocks. The Ramsey program consists for the government to choose a fiscal policy
that maximizes the aggregate welfare. This aggregate welfare, computed using a utilitar-
ian criterion, is simply the objective of the family head in equation (8).18 The following
definition formalizes this program, using the notations of Section 3.
Definition 2 (Ramsey program for a truncated economy) Let N > 0. Given ini-
tial conditions about the wealth distribution
(
S−1,eN , a−1,eN
)
eN∈EN , the initial public debt
B−1, the initial capital tax τK0 , and the initial aggregate state s−1, the Ramsey program
consists in choosing, at date 0, a fiscal policy made of lump-sum, capital, and labor tax
paths (Tt, τKt+1, τLt )t≥0, and of public debt paths (Bt)t≥0, that maximizes the aggregate wel-
fare defined in (8) among the set of competitive equilibria characterized in Definition 1.
17In this section, we achieved decentralization through a fiscal transfer Γ∗N+1, but this is not the only
option. Indeed, following the constructions of Alvarez et al. (2009) and Khan and Thomas (2015), it
is possible to provide a sequential decentralization of the island economy. Indeed, islands are devices to
pool income at each date t (and as such to provide insurance) for idiosyncratic risks occurring before date
t− (N + 1). As a consequence, if all agents are ex-ante identical, it is possible to achieve decentralization
using insurance contracts, which hedge at any date t the risks occurring before date t− (N + 1) among
agents with the same N -period history.
18Alternative social welfare functions can be used, but we focus on the most standard case.
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Since the period-0 capital tax rate is given, the capital tax path starts at date 1.
Equation (4) implies that the government can equivalently decide the post-tax interest
rate (rt)t≥1 and the post-tax wage rate (wt)t≥0 instead of the distorting taxes (τKt )t≥1 and
(τLt )t≥0, as in Chamley (1986). As a consequence, we can formalize the Ramsey program
as follows:
max
(Tt,rt+1,wt,Bt,(at,eN ,ct,eN ,lt,eN )eN∈EN )t≥0
E0
 ∞∑
t=0
βt
∑
eN∈EN
St,eNU(ct,eN , lt,eN )
 , (22)
Bt + F (Kt−1, Lt, st) ≥ G+ (1 + rt)Bt−1 + rtKt−1 + wtLt + Tt, (23)
for all eN ∈ EN :
at,eN + ct,eN = wtθeNt lt,eN1eN0 6=0 + δ1eN0 =0 + (1 + rt)a˜t,eN + Tt, (24)
Uc
(
ct,eN , lt,eN
)
− νt,eN = βEt
 ∑
e˜N∈EN
Πt+1,eN ,e˜NUc
(
ct+1,e˜N,lt+1,e˜N
)
(1 + rt+1)
, (25)
lt,eN =
(
wtθeNt
)ϕ
1eN0 >0 + δ1eN0 =0, (26)
νt,eN (at,eN + a) = 0, (27)
At =
∑
eN∈EN
St,eNat,eN , Lt =
∑
eN∈EN
St,eN θeNt lt,eN , Kt = At −Bt, (28)
ct,eN , lt,eN , (at,eN + a) ≥ 0, (29)
with the law of motion (6) of (St,eN )t≥0,eN∈EN , and the definition (7) of (a˜t,eN )t≥0,eN∈EN .
All constraints (23)–(29) should be understood, unless specified, for all st ∈ St and all
eN ∈ EN .19
Maximization devices in the Ramsey program are on the one hand individual quanti-
ties – consumption level, labor effort, and asset holdings – and on the other hand fiscal
instruments: public debt, lump-sum taxes, and post-tax interest and wage rates. Equation
(23) is the government budget constraint, while the individual budget constraint is given
in equation (24). The individual Euler equations for consumption and labor are provided
in equations (25) and (26), respectively. The complementary slackness condition is stated
in equation (27). Equation (28) gathers the aggregation for individual wealth and the
labor supply, as well as the financial market clearing. Finally, positivity and borrowing
19Again, Et[·] is the conditional expectation at date t with respect to aggregate shocks.
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constraints appear in equation (29).
5.2 Simplification of the Ramsey program
We simplify the formulation of the Ramsey program exposed in equations (22)–(29),
following Marcet and Marimon (2011). We first denote βtmt(st)St,eNλt,eN the (discounted)
Lagrange multiplier of the Euler equation of agent eN in state st. We also define for all
eN ∈ EN :
Λt,eN =
∑
eˆN∈EN St−1,eˆNλt−1,eˆNΠt,eˆN ,eN
St,eN
, (30)
which can be interpreted as the average for agents of island eN of their previous period
Lagrange multipliers for the Euler equation. Finally, we can notice that λt,eN = 0 if at,eN =
−a: λt,eN is zero when the credit constraint is binding. The product λt,eNνt,eN (for any t
and any eN) is thus always equal to 0. The following lemma summarizes our simplification
of the Ramsey program.
Lemma 1 (Simplified Ramsey program) The Ramsey program in equations (22)–(29)
can be simplified into:
max
(rt+1,wt,Bt,Tt,(at,eN ,ct,eN ,lt,eN )eN∈EN )t≥0
E0
∞∑
t=0
βt
∑
eN∈EN
St,eN
(
U(ct,eN , lt,eN ) (31)
+ Uc(ct,eN , lt,eN )
(
Λt,eN (1 + rt)− λt,eN
))
,
s.t. λt,eN = 0 if at,eN = −a, (32)
and subject to equations (6), (7), (23)–(26), (28)–(29), and (30).
The proof is relegated to Appendix C. The simplification of the Ramsey program, which
eases the computation of the maximization problem, is based on a re-writing of the La-
grangian to introduce Lagrange coefficients into the objective, as done by Marcet and
Marimon (2011). It could also provide a recursive formulation of the Ramsey program
that we do not need, as the sequential representation allows us to derive first-order con-
ditions, expressed in a way which eases the interpretation.
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6 Understanding fiscal policy when markets are in-
complete
6.1 First-order conditions
An understanding of optimal fiscal policy can be obtained from the first-order conditions
of the program (31), which are necessary conditions. A central concept for interpreting
all these conditions is a new valuation of liquidity, which we call the social valuation of
liquidity for agents eN and denote ψt,eN . It is formally defined as:
ψt,eN ≡ Uc(ct,eN , lt,eN )− Ucc(ct,eN , lt,eN )
(
λt,eN − Λt,eN (1 + rt)
)
. (33)
The valuation ψt,eN differs from the marginal utility of consumption Uc(ct,eN , lt,eN ) – which
can be seen as the private valuation of liquidity for agents eN– since ψt,eN takes into
consideration the Euler equations from periods t − 1 to t and from periods t to t + 1.
An extra consumption unit makes the agent more willing to smooth out her consumption
between periods t to t+ 1 and thus makes her Euler equation more “binding”. This more
“binding” constraint decreases the utility by the algebraic quantity Ucc(ct,eN , lt,eN )λt,eN ,
where λt,eN is the Lagrange multiplier of the agent’s Euler equation at date t. The
extra consumption unit at t also makes the agent less willing to smooth her consumption
between periods t − 1 to t and therefore “relaxes” the constraint of date t − 1. This is
reflected in Λt,eN .
It is easy to show that if the government could implement island-specific lump-sum
transfers (such as unconstrained Tt,eN ), it would implement µt = ψt,eN for all eN ∈ EN .
The difference µt − ψt,eN is thus a measure of the cost for island eN of imperfect and
distorting policy tools. Furthermore, since µt is the (normalized) Lagrange multiplier of
the government budget constraint (23), it measures the social value of liquidity for the
government. We will therefore call the difference µt−ψt,eN the liquidity valuation gap for
agents eN , as it is equal to the marginal gain of transferring resources from the budget
of island eN to the budget of the government. The liquidity valuation gap µt − ψt,eN can
be either positive or negative depending on the island, but, as shown below, the sum of
social values over all islands is non-negative.
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We now present and discuss the first-order conditions of the planner using these con-
cepts. We derive them formally in Appendix D.
Social valuation of government liquidity, µt. The dynamics of µt is
µt = βEt [µt+1 (1 + r˜t+1)] . (34)
Equation (34) sets equal the marginal benefit of one additional unit of debt at date t to
the marginal extra cost at date t + 1, using the before-tax return r˜t to value the next
period. On the one hand, the extra debt unit relaxes the government budget constraint
at date t by one unit and thus implies a benefit that amounts to the Lagrange multiplier
of the government budget constraint, µt. On the other hand, the extra debt unit implies
debt reimbursement and interest payment in the next payment, i.e., a total payment of
1+ r˜t+1 = 1+FK(At−Bt, Lt+1) that makes the next-period government budget constraint
stricter.
Liquidity valuation gaps, µt−ψt,eN . We begin with defining Ct as the set of islands
on which agents are credit-constrained at date t. Formally:
Ct = {eN ∈ EN , νt,eN > 0}. (35)
Then, for non credit-constrained islands, the dynamics of the liquidity valuation gap is:
∀eN ∈ EN \ Ct, µt − ψt,eN = βEt
 ∑
e˜N∈EN
(1 + rt+1)Πt+1,eN ,e˜N
(
µt+1 − ψt+1,e˜N
) . (36)
Equation (34) can be interpreted as a modified Euler equation for non credit-constrained
agents. It equalizes the current liquidity valuation gap µt − ψt,eN to its discounted value
tomorrow. The Euler equation for the liquidity valuation gap is similar to the Euler
equation for the private valuation of liquidity for the same agents (equation 25). Both the
agents and the planner perceive that the marginal gain to transfer resources to the next
period is rt.
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Labor taxes. The first-order condition for the post-tax real wage wt is:
∑
eN∈EN
St,eN lt,eN θeNt
Lt
(
µt − ψt,eN
)
= µtϕ
τLt
1− τLt
. (37)
Equation (37) sets equal the social gain of financing the government budget using labor
tax τLt (the left-hand side) to its cost (the right-hand side). More precisely, the left-hand
side is the marginal gain of transferring resources for all islands eN ∈ EN to the budget
of the government using an increase in labor tax τLt . This implies a liquidity valuation
gap µt−ψt,eN , for every island eN , which is weighted by its share in the total labor effort
S
t,eN
l
t,eN
θ
eN
t
Lt
, expressed in efficient units. This weight is thus proportional to the labor-tax
base. The right-hand side is the cost of labor tax distortion, which reflects the reduction
in the base of the labor tax. The magnitude of the distortion depends positively on the
fiscal wedge generated by labor tax τLt , the Frisch elasticity of labor supply ϕ, which
determines how agents adapt their labor effort to the tax distortion, and the government
liquidity valuation µt.
Capital taxes. The first-order condition for the post-tax interest rate rt can be written
as:
∑
eN∈EN
[
St,eN a˜t,eN
(
µt − ψt,eN
)]
=
∑
eN∈EN
St,eNUc(ct,eN , lt,eN )Λt,eN , (38)
where a˜t,eN is given by (7). Equation (38) sets equal the social gain of financing the
government budget using the distorting capital tax τKt (the left-hand side) to its cost
(the right-hand side). More precisely, the left-hand side is the average liquidity valuation
gap weighted by the before-tax wealth on each island, which is the tax base. The right-
hand side is the sum of individual distortions of a higher capital tax that affects individual
Euler equations, and more precisely, consumption smoothing between the previous and the
current periods. Therefore, individual distortions are measured by Λt,eN , which assesses
the tightness of Euler equations between t− 1 and t, and thus the willingness to smooth
out consumption between both periods.
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Lump-sum transfer Tt. The first-order condition for the transfer Tt is:
∑
eN∈EN
St,eN
(
µt − ψt,eN
)
≥ 0, with equality when Tt > 0. (39)
This equation states that, when the positivity constraint on the lump-sum transfer is not
binding, the government sets the population-weighted sum of liquidity valuation gaps to
0. In particular, this would also be the case in the absence of any positivity constraint.
However, when the constraint Tt ≥ 0 is binding and when the government would actually
like to tax some island using the lump-sum instrument, the constraint Tt ≥ 0 binds, and
the social benefit of liquidity for the government is higher than its average cost over all
islands: µt >
∑
eN∈EN St,eNψt,eN .20
6.2 Steady-state fiscal policy
Using first-order conditions, we derive theoretical implications about the steady-state
optimal fiscal policy. We assume here that the steady-state solution is interior – and we
will numerically check that this is the case in our quantitative exercise.21 Indeed, Straub
and Werning (2014) have provided examples of economies where this is not the case.
This avoids discussing economies with zero long-run wealth. The main results, which
are independent of N , are summarized in the next proposition. To denote steady-state
variables, we simply drop the subscript t.
Proposition 3 (Steady-state) In the interior steady-state of the Ramsey equilibrium:
1. the marginal productivity of capital is pinned down by the discount factor β:
1 + FK(K,L) =
1
β
, (40)
2. the capital tax is non-negative; it is positive if and only if credit-constraints bind for
20Allowing for negative transfers does not imply that (39) holds with equality. Indeed, the ability of
the lowest income agents to pay lump-sum taxes may provide a binding bound on negative taxes.
21More precisely, we show that such a steady state exists, and we use perturbation methods (for
the aggregate shock) to show that it is locally stable considering both the agents and the government
optimal policy. See Chen, Chien, and Yang (2017) for a discussion and a formal proof of the existence of
well-defined steady state in a related environment.
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some agents, or more formally:
τK =
∑
eN∈C SeNνeN
(1− β)∑eN∈EN SeNUc (ceN , leN ) , (41)
where we recall that C is the set of islands where credit constraints bind at the
steady-state, and νeN is the Lagrange multiplier of credit constraint for island eN ;
3. the labor tax is determined by the net average liquidity valuation gap:
µϕ
τL
1− τL =
∑
eN∈EN
SeN leN θeN
L
(µ− ψeN ) . (42)
The first item in equation (40) of Proposition 3 is a direct implication of the gov-
ernment Euler equation (34). As a consequence, the marginal productivity of capital is
determined by the discount factor β only, as originally explained by Aiyagari (1995). This
important restriction is the so-called “modified golden rule”.
To the best of our knowledge, the second item in Proposition 3 is new in the literature.
We prove that the capital tax is always non-negative and that its value is determined by
the severity of credit constraints. If credit constraints do not bind for any agent – for
instance, if they are chosen to be below the natural borrowing limit, as defined by Aiyagari
(1994) – then the equilibrium capital tax will be 0.22 Conversely, the steady-state capital
tax will be positive if and only if some agents are credit-constrained. Indeed, when credit
constraints are binding for some agents, credit-constrained agents cannot borrow as much
as they would like to, while non-constrained agents save too much to self-insure. Both
effects contribute to create an oversupply of liquidity. To correct this oversupply, the
government raises the capital tax, which decreases the post-tax interest rate and thus the
incentives to save.23 Aiyagari (1995) proves that the capital tax is positive in a similar
environment without aggregate shocks. Our contribution is to connect the capital tax rate
to the severity of credit constraints. The steady-state level of public debt is determined as
a residual of the government budget constraint, and it can be either positive or negative.
22The denominator in equation (42) is indeed bounded away from zero because the economy is finite,
i.e., not all marginal utilities can be simultaneously zero.
23This logic is already present in Woodford (1990), and discussed in Davila et al. (2012). The last
paper differs from ours, because the authors analyze the constrained optimality of the capital stock in
a situation where the planner can change agents’ saving decisions without distortion, while we focus on
distorting fiscal instruments.
24
When credit constraints do not bind, we can check that the level of public debt is
indeterminate, which relates our results to those recently obtained by Bhandari, Evans,
Golosov, and Sargent (2016b). Indeed, as no agent is credit constrained, the capital
tax is null, τK = 0, and the post-tax gross interest rate amounts to 1/β. When public
spending is not too large, a continuum of values for the steady-state public debt and
transfers both satisfy the first-order conditions of the government and the government
budget constraint.24
7 Quantitative properties of the optimal tax system
We now investigate quantitatively the properties of our finite-state model. After describ-
ing the calibration – which is standard – and the steady-state, we carefully analyze the
convergence of the economy as a function of N . We will explain that a small N is suffi-
cient for capturing the steady-state of the limit economy. We finally explore the response
of the limited-heterogeneity economy to a technology shock in terms of impulse-response
functions and second-order moments.
7.1 Calibration.
The utility function is u
(
c− χ l1+
1
ϕ
1+ 1
ϕ
)
= log
(
c− l1+
1
ϕ
1+ 1
ϕ
)
, with a Frisch elasticity of labor
supply set to ϕ = 0.5, as is consistent with empirical estimates (Chetty, Guren, Manoli,
and Weber 2011).
The aggregate state is assumed to follow an AR(1) process: st = ρsst−1 + εst , where
(εst)t≥0 is a white-noise process with a distribution N (0, σ2s). The production function is
a Cobb-Douglas with a constant capital depreciation µ: F (K,L, s) = ξ(s)KαL1−α − µK,
where ξ(s) = exp(s) is the technology level. The labor share is α = 0.33.
We calibrate the idiosyncratic risk to the unemployment risk, as in Imrohoroğlu (1992),
Krusell and Smith (1998) or Challe and Ragot (2016) among others. Households can be
either employed, in which case they choose their labor supply, or unemployed, in which
24It is now well understood that the optimal public debt is well-defined only if there are some constraints
on fiscal instruments. Otherwise, a form of Ricardian equivalence holds in incomplete-market economies.
In our economy, the absence of lump-sum taxes is a sufficient condition.
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case they obtain δ consumption units from home production. This corresponds to E = 1.
The period is a quarter. For the employment risk, we use the calibration for the US of
Challe and Ragot (2016), which is based on the strategy of Shimer (2003). The parameter
δ is set such that home production amounts to 50% of market income. The quarterly job
finding rate is 80% and the quarterly job separation rate is 5%. The transition matrix
is thus M =
 0.2 0.8
0.05 0.95
. The quarterly depreciation rate equals µ = 2.5%. The
persistence of the standard values technology shock is set to ρs = 0.95 and the standard
deviation is σs = 1%. Finally, public spending is set to G = 0.71, which implies a steady-
state public spending-to-GDP ratio equal to 19%, the postwar average value in the US.
Table 1 summarizes parameter values.
β µ δ/(wl) G ρs σs
0.99 2.5% 50% 0.71 0.95 1%
Table 1: Parameter values
The remaining parameter is N , which parametrizes the truncation of idiosyncratic
histories. In the baseline model, we consider N = 8, meaning an economy populated
by 28 = 256 different households. Increasing N further does not significantly affect the
convergence, as we discuss in Section 7.3.
7.2 Solution method and steady-state results
Our truncated equilibrium enables us to solve the model using a standard perturbation
method. First, we determine the steady-state allocation without aggregate shocks, using
an iteration over the post-tax interest rate, as described in Appendix F. Second, we
linearize all equations around the steady-state (including first-order conditions of the
Ramsey problem) to obtain the dynamics of the fiscal system and constrained-optimal
allocations after a small technology shock. The technology shock is small enough such
that, for all simulations, the set of credit-constrained islands remains unchanged and does
not vary along the business cycle, which can be shown by simulating the model for a high
number of periods.
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For N = 8, the dynamic system is composed of a total of 1554 variables (including all
Lagrange coefficients), which are simulated using Dynare. The gains of the perturbation
method are twofold. First, we can choose a continuous state-space for the technology
shock. Second, we can use the same mature methodology as the one used in the DSGE
literature to compute IRFs and second-order moments. This means that we can rely
on tools (e.g., Dynare) that have already been developed and make our results directly
comparable with a large branch of the literature. The additional gain is that the model
is solved in three seconds.25
Steady-state results. We simulate our incomplete-market economy with N = 8.
Results are gathered in Table 2. First, the marginal productivity of capital is pinned down
by the discount factor of households (see Proposition 3). In consequence, the annualized
real interest rate is r˜ = 4.17%, the wage rate is w˜ = 1.0161, and the aggregate capital
stock is K/Y = 2.35.
The public debt amounts to −8.64 or −231% of GDP. The government doesn’t hold
all the capital stock and households hold a small amount of assets. A negative public
debt allows the government to obtain resources in a non-distorting way. One can show
that if markets for the idiosyncratic risk were complete (case N = 0 in our setup), the
government would hold all the capital stock to finance its expenditures out of capital
income. The small amount of assets held by households is thus held for self-insurance
purpose. The labor tax is equal to 14%, the capital tax amounts to 27%, and 5% of the
population is credit constrained. Note that the capital tax base is very small.
r˜(%) w˜ τK(%) τL(%) B/Y (%) K/Y (%) L Y
4.17 1.0161 27 14 −231 2.35 1.24 3.74
Table 2: Steady-state outcome
How do our results compare with the literature studying the optimal steady-state debt
level? Aiyagari and McGrattan (1998) find an optimal debt over GDP of 60%, maximizing
steady-state welfare. Açikgöz (2015) shows that the results are quantitatively different
25Pröhl (2017) uses polynomial chaos expansions to discretize cross-sectional distributions, which offer
global solutions and avoid using perturbation methods.
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if one solves for the Ramsey program instead of maximizing steady-state welfare. He
finds an optimal quantity of debt to be above 300% of GDP. Dyrda and Pedroni (2016)
find a negative optimal debt-to-GDP ratio, below −300% of GDP. These substantial
quantitative differences can for a large be explained by parameter choices, such as the
elasticity of labor supply or the specification of the income process, for which there is no
strong consensus. In what follows, we focus on the dynamics of the fiscal system, what is
the contribution of our paper.
7.3 Convergence results
We now simulate the model for different values of N and justify our choice of N = 8
Amount of insurance. We simulate the economy for different values of N , and
compute the amount of risk-sharing induced by the truncation of histories at the steady-
state. The natural metric is the pooling transfer (expressed as a percentage of the house-
hold’s labor income for normalization purpose) that households with the same N -period
histories should receive for having the same wealth. Formally, with the notations of
Section 4, this measure is Γ∗N+1(eN+1)/(wθeN leN ) and the average value across histories
of this transfer is 0 by construction. In Table 3, we report the average standard de-
viation across all histories eN+1 of the transfer Γ∗N+1, normalized by the labor income,
sdeN+1(Γ∗N+1(eN+1)/(wθeN leN )). This is our proxy for measuring the distance to a stan-
dard Bewley economy, for which this quantity should be zero.
N 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Sd(%) 18.54 6.94 5.99 4.98 4.05 3.20 2.60 2.10 1.70 1.30
Table 3: Transfer as a function of N
One can observe that the standard deviation of the transfer is decreasing asN increases
and converges to 0. For N = 8, the standard deviation is only 2.1% of income. We checked
that the policy rules (for each history) are very close to the one implied by the true Bewley
model.
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Tax system. As a second investigation of the convergence properties of the model,
we determine the evolution of the optimal tax system as a function of N . Note that for
all economies, the before-tax prices are r˜ = 4.17%, and w˜ = 1.0161, while the aggregate
capital stock is K/Y = 2.35. Table 4 presents, for different values of N , steady-state
values of the equilibrium tax system (i.e., capital tax τK , labor tax τL, and debt-to GDP
ratio B/Y ).
N 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
τK 0.23 0.23 0.24 0.24 0.25 0.26 0.26 0.26 0.27 0.27
τL 0.14 0.14 0.14 0.14 0.14 0.14 0.14 0.14 0.14 0.14
B/Y −2.29 −2.30 −2.31 −2.31 −2.31 −2.31 −2.31 −2.31 −2.31 −2.31
Table 4: Fiscal system as a function of N
We can observe that the tax system is converging rapidly to the steady-state tax
system. Furthermore, the total labor supply hardly changes when we increase N , as it
increases from L = 1.2408 for N = 1 to L = 1.2414 for N = 10. We have also checked
that the dynamic properties presented below are unchanged when we increase N . As a
consequence, we are confident that N = 8 is a good approximation of the limit economy.
7.4 Effects of a technology shock.
We now simulate the economy for 200 periods after a transitory technology shock of 1%
on impact. Figure 1 plots the dynamics of 12 key variables. All variables are presented in
percentage deviation from steady-state, except taxes (taul and tauk) and the real interest
rate (r), which are in level deviation.
The first panel in Figure 1 plots the TFP shock. GDP increases by 1.2%. Aggregate
consumption (Ctot) reaches its maximum after periods and then decreases smoothly. The
capital stock (K) increases progressively, with a maximal increase of 0.8%, whereas the
aggregate savings of private agents (A) increases rapidly, by 2% at the maximum. The
public debt (B) decreases – in other words, public savings increase what contributes to
an increase in the capital stock to benefit from the high TFP. Public debt slowly reverts
to its steady-state level.
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The third line plots the labor and capital tax rates. The labor tax (taul) increase a
little bit after the technology shock, while the capital tax (tauk) increases a lot before
converging after one period back to its steady-state value. As a consequence, one finds that
the capital tax is very volatile and increases a lot after the technology shock to increase
the resources of the government and to decrease public debt. These qualitative properties
are also found with a representative agent (Farhi 2010). With incomplete markets, public
debt is (slowly) mean-reverting toward its steady-state value. The Lagrange multiplier of
the government budget (mu) decreases, because the budget constraint of the government
is relaxed as the economy is wealthier. The last line plots after tax real wage (w), real
interest rate (r) and total labor (L).
Figure 1: Aggregate IRFs after a 1% increase in TFP.
Finally, Table 5 provides unconditional second-order moments generated by the simu-
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lated model. As consistent with our analysis of IRFs, the standard deviation of the labor
tax is low (0.012) and the one of the capital tax (0.80) and of the public debt (2.28) are
high compared to output (0.23). Public debt is volatile because it reverts slowly to its
mean, with an autocorrelation of 0.99. The persistence of capital tax is very low (auto-
correlation of 0.02) compared to labor taxes (0.99) and public debt (0.99), as observed
discussing IRFs.
sd(Y ) sd(τK) sd(τL) sd(B) corr(Y, Y−1)
0.23 0.80 0.012 2.28 0.97
corr(B, Y ) corr(τK , Y ) corr(τL, Y ) corr(τK , K) corr(τL, K)
−0.857 −0.026 −0.435 0.027 −0.839
Table 5: Second-order moments
The previous results provide some insights for other approximation methods, which are
used in similar setups with aggregate shocks. In particular, the aggregate law of motion
of the capital stock used in Krusell and Smith (1998) is not a sufficient statistics for the
evolution of aggregate variables. Indeed, the capital tax is much more volatile than the
capital stock and both variables are almost uncorrelated (correlation below 3%). For this
reason, it is not easy to use the procedure of Krusell and Smith (1998) to compare our
results to the one implied by the application of an approximate aggregation procedure.
It may be possible to introduce an additional aggregate law of motion for the capital tax
for households to form correct expectations with simple rules. Such an investigation is
obviously outside the scope of the current paper.26
8 Concluding remarks
The market equilibrium in an incomplete insurance-market economy with aggregate shocks
can be represented as the allocation of a family-head program. This representation allows
to generate a finite-dimensional state-space equilibrium, in which the Ramsey outcome
26More generally, we compare our truncated procedure with an approximate-aggregation procedure in
a companion paper (in an economy without optimal fiscal policy), using additional computational tricks
to improve the fit of the truncated economy.
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can be studied with aggregate shocks and various fiscal tools. We apply this framework to
study optimal fiscal policy, when positive transfers, distorting taxes on capital and labor,
and public debt are available. A first interest of this framework is to allow for the ana-
lytical derivation of properties of the tax system, such as the steady-state level of capital
and labor taxes. A second interest is the ability to simply simulate these economies. We
apply this quantitative investigation to a standard economy, where the employment risk
is uninsurable. We carefully investigate the convergence of this economy as a function
of N and show that a reasonably small value of N is sufficient for capturing the main
characteristics of the limit economy.
The methodology presented in this paper could be applied to different settings to
understand distortions in more general incomplete insurance-market economies. First, we
could increase the number of instruments available to the government, such as non-linear
tax schedules. Second, additional heterogeneity, such as the structure of qualification,
could be introduced to make more extensive use of empirical estimates of key parameters.
Considering, health and family shocks and a labor market with different education groups
is an obvious route to follow in future works. Third, and just as importantly, it is also
possible to include other distortions, such as nominal frictions or frictional labor markets,
to derive optimal policies in these richer environments.
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Appendix
A Proof of Proposition 1
Consider an agent endowed with the N + 1-period history eN+1 = (eˆN , e) ∈ EN+1. The
history eN+1 can also be written as eN+1 = (eN , eN). In the former notation, eN+1 is seen
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as the history e˜N ∈ EN with the successor state e ∈ E , while in the latter notation, eN+1 is
seen as the state eN ∈ E followed by history eN ∈ EN . The solutions to the maximization
program (18)–(20) are the policy rules denoted c = gN+1c (a, eN+1), a′ = gN+1a′ (a, eN+1),
l = gN+1l (a, eN+1) and the multiplier ν = gN+1ν (a, eN+1) satisfying the following first-order
conditions:
Uc (c, l) = βE
∑
e′∈E
Me,e′Uc (c′, l′) (1 + r)
+ ν, (43)
l = (χwθe)ϕ1e>0 + δ1e=0, (44)
ν(a′ + a¯) = 0 and ν ≥ 0. (45)
We use a guess-and-verify strategy. The transfer is constructed such that all agents
with the same N -period history will have the same after-transfer wealth. The measure
of agents with history eN follows the same law of motion as (6) in the island economy
and this measure is also equal to SeN . If all agents with the same history (eˆN , e), e ∈ E
have the same beginning-of-period wealth aeˆN , the after-transfer wealth, denoted aˆeN , of
agents with history eN  eˆN will be:
aˆ′eN =
∑
e˜N∈EN
Se˜N
SeN
Πe˜N ,eNa′e˜N , (46)
for agents with the same history to hold the same wealth. By construction, aˆeN follows a
dynamics similar to equation (7) of the “after-pooling” wealth a˜t,eN in the island economy.
The transfer denoted Γ∗N+1 that enables all agents with the same history to have the same
wealth is:
Γ∗N+1(eN+1) = (1 + r) (aˆeN − aeˆN ) , (47)
where we use eN+1 = (eˆN , e) = (eN , eN). The transfer Γ∗N+1 defined in (47) swaps the
beginning-of-period wealth (1+r)aeˆN by the average wealth (1+r)aˆeN . By construction, all
agents with current history eN will have an identical after-transfer wealth, independently
of the previous-period history eˆN . Since there is a continuum with mass Se˜N of agents
with history e˜N , in which each individual agent is atomistic, all agents take the transfer
Γ∗N+1 as given.
Finally, it is easy to check that the transfer scheme is balanced in each period. Us-
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ing the definition (46) of aˆeN , we obtain for eN = (eNN−1, . . . , eN1 , eN0 ) ∈ EN , SeN aˆeN =∑
eˆN∈EN SeˆNΠeˆN ,eNaeˆN =
∑
eˆ∈E S(eˆ,eNN−1,...,eN1 )M eN1 ,eN0 a(eˆ,eNN−1,...,eN1 ). Therefore, we obtain:∑
e˜∈E S(e˜,eN )Γ∗N+1(e˜, eN) = (1 + r)
[∑
e˜∈E S(e˜,eN )
(
aˆeN − a(e˜,eNN−1,...,eN1 )
)]
= 0, where the last
equality comes from the definition of aˆeN in equation (46).
B Proof of Proposition
The proof runs in three steps. In the remainder, we use the following notation. For
N > k > 0, ek = (ek−1, . . . , e0) ∈ Ek, eN,k = (eN , . . . , ek) ∈ EN+1−k, and (eN,k, ek) =
(eN , . . . , ek, ek−1, . . . , e0).
B.1 A contraction lemma
We denote by Conv(A) the convex hull of the set A ⊂ R, and µL the Lebesgue measure
on R.
Lemma 2 (Contraction lemma) Assume that A ⊂ [−a¯, amax] and that the conditions
of Proposition 2 are fulfilled. Let B =
{
gN+1a′ (a, (eˆN,N¯ , eN¯))|eˆN,N¯ ∈ EN+1−N¯ , a ∈ A
}
for
any eN¯ ∈ E N¯ ,. We have then µL (Conv(B)) ≤ κ× µL (Conv(A)).
Proof. SinceB ⊂ R, we have by definition of the convex hull, Conv(A) = [min(A),max(A)]
and Conv(B) = [min(B),max(B)]. Let a′ = max(A) and a = min(A), then µL (Conv(A)) =
a′ − a and B ⊂ [gN+1a′ (a, (eˆN,N¯ , eN¯)), g(a′, (e˜N,N¯ , eN¯))] for some eˆN,N¯ , e˜N,N¯ ∈ EN+1−N¯ .
Therefore, we obtain µL (Conv(B)) ≤ gN+1a′ (a′, (e˜N+1−N¯ , eN¯)) − gN+1a′ (a, (eˆN+1−N¯ , eN¯)).
Applying the Lipschitz property (21) directly yields µL (Conv(B)) ≤ κ × µL (Conv(A)).
B.2 Proof of the convergence of Γ∗N+1
Let N > 0. Proposition 1 shows that when the transfer is Γ∗N+1, there are (E + 1)N
possible end-of-period asset holdings denoted (a′eˆN )eˆN∈EN . Let AN,−1 be the set of all
possible end-of-period asset holdings, in the previous period. We define:
A
(N)
N (eN) = {a′eˆN ∈ AN,−1|eN  eˆN}, for eN ∈ EN , (48)
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as the set of all possible beginning-of-period and before-transfer asset holdings of agents
with current history eN . In other words, it is the set of all possible previous-period
wealth levels of agents with current history eN . Since the after-transfer wealth level aˆeN
of (46) is by construction an average of before-transfer wealth levels a′eˆN , we have aˆeN ∈
Conv
(
A
(N)
N (eN)
)
.
We define pi(eN) = {eˆN |eN  eˆN} the set of possible predecessors of eN . We rewrite
(48) as: A(N)N (eN) = {a′eˆN ∈ AN,−1|eˆN ∈ pi(eN)}. For any a′eˆN ∈ A(N)N (eN), there exists
e˜N ∈ EN such that eˆN  e˜N and a′eˆN = gN+1a′ (ae˜N , (e˜N , eˆN0 )) = gN+1a′ (ae˜N , (e˜N , eN1 )) –since
eN1 = eˆN0 . In other words, a′eˆN is the optimal choice of an agent who had in the previous
period the N -history e˜N , which is thus a possible past of eN . Using the notation pi2 = pi◦pi,
e˜N ∈ pi2(eN), we can define:
A
(N)
N−1(eN) = {a′e˜N ∈ AN,−2|e˜N ∈ pi2(eN) and gN+1a′ (a′e˜N , (e˜N , eN1 )) ∈ A(N)N (eN)},
which is the set of all possible end-of-period asset holdings two periods ago of agents with
current history eN . Similarly, we define for any 0 < k < N :
A
(N)
N−k(eN) = {a′e˜N ∈ AN,−k−1|e˜N ∈ pik+1(eN) and gN+1a′ (a′e˜N , (e˜N , eNk )) ∈ A(N)N−k+1(eN)},
which allows us to construct a sequence of sets (A(N)N−k)k=0,...,N (eNk is the element number
k in eN , i.e. the state k periods ago for an agent with current history eN). In words,
A
(N)
N−k(eN) is the set of all possible end-of-period asset holdings k periods ago of agents
with current history eN . Iterating backward to construct those sets, we thus go back in
time to construct sets of possible wealth levels (instead of histories).
In the previous notation pik+1 denotes pi ◦ . . . ◦ pi (k + 1 times). Note that we could
equivalently define A(N)N−k+1(eN) as:
A
(N)
N−k+1(eN) = {gN+1a′ (a′e˜N , (e˜N , eNk ))|e˜N ∈ pik+1(eN) and a′e˜N ∈ A(N)N−k(eN)}.
In words, A(N)N−k+1(eN) is the set of successors (for relevant histories) of agents with
wealth levels in A(N)N−k(eN). If 1 ≤ k ≤ N − N¯ , we deduce, applying Lemma (2),
µL
(
Conv
(
A
(N)
N−k+1(eN)
))
≤ κµL
(
Conv(A(N)N−k(eN))
)
, and iterating forward from k = 1
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to k = N − N¯ − 1 to k = N − 1, one finds:
µL
(
Conv(A(N)N (eN))
)
≤ κN−N¯µL
(
Conv(A(N)
N¯
(eN))
)
. (49)
Since amax (−a¯) is the largest (lowest) wealth levels by definition, AN ⊂ [−a¯, amax] and for
all k, A(N)N−k(eN) ⊂ AN ⊂ [−a¯, amax]. This implies that we have µL
(
Conv(A(N)
N¯
(eN))
)
≤
amax + a¯. Second we have showed that aˆeN , aeˆN ∈ Conv
(
A
(N)
N (eN)
)
for any eˆN ∈ pi(eN).
This implies that |aˆeN − aeˆN | ≤ µL
(
Conv
(
A
(N)
N (eN)
))
. In consequence, we have from
equation (49):|aˆeN − aeˆN | ≤ κN−N¯(amax+a¯), which can be made arbitrarily small (0 < κ <
1), when N increases. We deduce from (47) that lim N→∞ supeN+1∈EN+1 |Γ∗N+1(eN+1)| = 0.
B.3 Convergence of the value function
The last steps is a standard convergence proof. Let ε > 0. There exists N¯ such that for
all N ≥ N¯ : |Γ∗N+1| < ε. Define:
V (+ε)(a, e) = max
a′≥−a¯,c≥0,l≥0
U(c, l) + βE
 ∑
e˜NeN
Me,e′VN+1(a′, e′)
 , (50)
a′ + c = wθel1e 6=0 + δ1e=0 + (1 + r)a+ T + ε, (51)
with l = δ if e = 0. Similarly, V (−ε)(a, e) is the value function where the budget constraint
is diminished by −ε (ε is low enough for all agents’ resources to remain positive).
Using standard dynamic programming arguments with bounded returns (see Stokey,
Lucas, and Prescott 1989 Section 9.2), one has for all a ∈ [−a¯, amax], e ∈ E , then
V (+ε)(a, e) ≤ V Bewley(a, e) ≤ V (−ε)(a, e) and V (+ε)(a, e) ≤ VN+1(a, eN+1) ≤ V (−ε)(a, e).
The last inequality follows from the bounds on the transfers Γ∗N+1. As a consequence, for
all a ∈ [−a¯, amax], e ∈ E :
∣∣∣V Bewley(a, e)− VN+1(a, eN+1)∣∣∣ ≤ ∣∣∣V (+ε)(a, e)− V (−ε)(a, e)∣∣∣ ,
which can be made arbitrarily small, as [amax, a]× E is compact and V (±ε) is continuous
in ε.
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C Proof of Lemma 1
We use the methodology of Marcet and Marimon (2011) to simplify the Ramsey program.
Denoting βtmt(st)St,eNλt,eN the Lagrange multiplier of the Euler equation for island eN
at date t, the objective of the Ramsey program (22)–(29) can be rewritten as:
J = E0
∞∑
t=0
βt
∑
eN∈EN
St,eNU(ct,eN , lt,eN )− Et
∞∑
t=0
βt
∑
eN∈EN
St,eNλt,eN (52)
×
Uc(ct,eN , lt,eN )− νt,eN − βEt
 ∑
eˆN∈EN
Πt+1,eN ,eˆNUc(ct+1,eˆN , lt+1,eˆN )(1 + rt+1)

With λt,eNνt,eN = 0 and the definition (30) of Λt,eN , (52) yields after some manipulations
the objective in (31), which is maximized subject to constraints (23)–(29), except (25).
D Derivation of first-order conditions for the Ramsey
program
We compute the first-order conditions of the simplified Ramsey program (31)–(32). Let
βtmt(st)µt be the Lagrange multiplier of the government budget constraint (23). The
Lagrangian is:
L = E0
∞∑
t=0
βt
∑
eN∈EN
St,eN
(
U(ct,eN , lt,eN ) + Uc(ct,eN , lt,eN )
(
Λt,eN (1 + rt)− λt,eN
))
(53)
− E0
∞∑
t=0
µtβ
t (Gt +Bt−1 + rtAt−1 + wtLt + Tt −Bt − F (At−1 −Bt−1, Lt, st−1)) ,
where ct,eN = wtθeNt lt,eN1eN0 6=0 + δ1eN0 =0 + (1 + rt)a˜t,eN − at,eN + Tt, for all eN ∈ EN , and
lt,eN = (χwtθeN )ϕ1eN0 >0 + δ1eN0 =0 (using (7), (24) and (26)).
First-order conditions with respect to Bt, rt, and Tt are straightforward.
Derivative with respect to at,eN . It yields for all eN ∈ EN \ Ct:
ψt,eN =βEt
∑
e˜N∈EN
(1 + rt+1)Πt+1,eN ,e˜Nψt+1,eN − βEtµt+1(rt+1 − r˜t+1). (54)
Combining (34) with (54) yields equation (36).
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Derivative with respect to wt. We obtain:
µtLt
(
1 + ϕ
wt
(wt − FL(Kt−1, Lt, st−1))
)
=
∑
eN∈EN
St,eN θeN lt,eNψt,eN . (55)
Using wt − FL(Kt−1, Lt, st−1) = wt − w˜t = − τ
L
t
1−τLt
w˜t, equation (55) becomes after some
algebra µtLt
(
1− ϕ τLt1−τLt
)
= ∑eN∈EN St,eN θeN lt,eNψt,eN . Since Lt = ∑eN∈EN St,eN θeN lt,eN ,
we deduce equation (37).
E Proof of Proposition 3
First-order conditions (34) and (37) immediately imply (40) and (42) at the steady-state.
Now, we sum individual consumption Euler equations (25) for all eN ∈ EN \ C (i.e., when
νeN = 0):
∑
eN∈EN\C
SeNUc(ceN , leN ) = β(1 + (1− τ k)r˜)
 ∑
e˜N∈EN
∑
eN∈EN\C
SeNΠeN ,e˜NUc(ce˜N , le˜N )
 .
We now split the sum as ∑eN∈EN\C = ∑eN∈EN −∑eN∈C. After some manipulation, we get
βτ kr˜
∑
eN∈EN
SeNUc(ceN , leN ) =
∑
eN∈C
SeN
×
Uc(ceN , leN )− β(1 + (1− τ k)r˜)
 ∑
e˜N∈EN
ΠeN ,e˜NUc(ce˜N , le˜N )
 ,
where in the right-hand side we recognize the “Euler inequality” for constrained agents.
Using equation (25) and βr˜ = 1− β, we obtain equation (41).
F Algorithm to solve the model
General method. Our algorithm, which relies on a guess-and-verify strategy, is as
follows.
1. We determine the steady-state of the Ramsey program (see below).
2. We write a code that writes the set of dynamic equations in Dynare. We use the
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Dynare solver to double-check our steady-state computations and to simulate the
model.
3. We finally verify that the set of credit-constrained islands does not change in the
presence of aggregate shocks.
Finding the steady-state. We now describe in more detail the algorithm to find the
steady-state (step 2 of the general method).
1. We guess the set C of islands that are credit-constrained. We choose a post-tax
interest rate r and a transfer value T (typically T = 0) and a post-tax wage rate w.
Then:
(a) We compute the labor supply on each island eN , using agents’ first-order condi-
tions (26). We then deduce the aggregate labor L. We compute the aggregate
capital K with FK(K,L) = β−1 − 1.
(b) We determine individual consumption levels and asset holdings using equations
(24), (25), and (7). We deduce a corresponding value for public spending, given
by G = F (K,L)− rA− wL− T .
(c) We set a value of µ. We set values ψeN , eN ∈ C (for credit-constrained islands).
Using (36), we then solve for ψeN , eN ∈ EN \ C (unconstrained islands). We
obtain then the λeN , eN ∈ EN using (33) defining ψeN . We finally iterate on
ψeN , eN ∈ C, until we have λeN = 0 for eN ∈ C (constrained islands). We
iterate on µ until equation (38) holds at the steady-state.
(d) We iterate on w until (37) holds at the steady-state.
2. We iterate on r until G/Y matches its target. Check that the value T = 0 is indeed
the equilibrium value, otherwise iterate. We finally verify that Euler inequalities
are strict for islands eN ∈ C to check that the set C of constrained islands is correct.
Otherwise, we iterate on C.
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